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We introduce a new dataset, Contemporary Slavery in Armed Conflict (CSAC), coding 
instances and types of enslavement in armed conflict from 1989 to 2016, building on the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program. CSAC currently covers 171 armed conflicts from 1989 to 
2016, with the unit of analysis being the conflict-year. We identify different types of 
enslavement within these conflicts, and find that 87% contained incidences of child 
soldiers, 32% included sexual exploitation/forced marriage, 21% included forced Labor, 
and 14% contained instances of human trafficking. The use of enslavement in armed 
conflict to support strategic aims is also identified, and found in about 17% of cases. We 
see the coding of slavery within conflict as a step toward generating greater 
understanding of when and how state and non-state actors use enslavement within 
conflict, with the goal of mitigating and possibly eradicating slavery in warfare. 
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An estimated 40 million persons are enslaved globally within many types of slavery, 
including debt bondage, state-sponsored forced labor, enslavement into commercial 
sexual exploitation, and forced marriage (Alliance 8.7, 2021). Recent studies have 
illuminated the breadth and size of contemporary slavery (e.g., Bales & Trodd 2008, Bales 
2012, Skinner 2008, Global Slavery Index 2016), prompting action by public and private 
stakeholders. In 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Goal/Target 8.7 calls nations to 'take immediate and effective measures to 
eradicate forced labor, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor, including recruitment and 
use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labor in all its forms' (UN Stats, 2021). 
 
Goal 8.7 demonstrates the need for scholarship at the intersection of modern slavery and 
armed conflict. While child soldiers are known in conflict (e.g., Beber and Blattman, 2013; 
Lasley and Thyne, 2015; Gates and Reich, 2010; Haer and Böhmelt, 2017; Hoiskar 2001), 
less understood is how much, and in what ways, other types of enslavement are 
perpetrated by combatants. What predicts the risk of enslavement in conflict? When 
might combatants use enslavement tactically or strategically in warfare? When conflict 
ends, what happens to the enslaved and how might they reclaim their lives? Such 
questions drive our interest and the creation of the Contemporary Slavery in Armed 
Conflict (CSAC) dataset.  
 
Among studies of forced sexual exploitation within armed conflict (e.g., McAlpine, 
Hossain and Zimmerman, 2016), or forced marriage in armed conflict (e.g., O’Brien, 2016), 
few data exist. Despite this, interest has increased around issues such as forced 'brides' 
in war (Topol, 2017). The Nobel Committee underlined this by awarding the 2018 Peace 
Prize to Nadia Murad, a member of the Yazidi community in Iraq. Murad was captured, 
tortured, raped, and enslaved by ISIS forces in 2014. After her escape, Murad became a 
UN Goodwill Ambassador speaking out against sexual assault and enslavement in war.  
 
Responding to such evidence, we developed coding to identify when and how state and 
non-state actors have used enslavement within conflict. Taking inspiration from the work 
of Cohen and Nordås (2014) on sexual violence in armed conflict, our coding analyzed 
armed conflict from 1989 to 2016 in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.  Using these  data, 
we interrogated sources to find instances of enslavement, conflict-by-conflict, year-by-
year.  This is the first systematic and large-scale inquiry into the prevalence and types of 
enslavement within modern armed conflict.  
 
Definitions and Scope 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) defines conflict as, 'a contested incompatibility 
that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two 
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-
related deaths in a calendar year' (Gleditsch et al, 2002; Pettersson, Therese & Magnus 





others much longer, altogether totaling 1,113 conflict-years. All conflicts had at least two 
sides: Side A (a nation-state), and Side B (a nation-state, or one or more non-state actors, 
such as rebel groups, insurgents, or other sub-state actors). To examine variation in how 
enslavement might be used in conflict over time, the unit of analysis is the conflict-year, 
and instances of enslavement are coded by conflict-year.  
 
To code enslavement within the UCDP data from 1989 to 2016, we used the Systematic 
Review Method, which 'systematically search[es] for all available evidence, appraising the 
quality of all the included studies, and synthesizing the evidence into a usable form' 
(Mahatni et al, 2018: 127). We used key terms shown in Table I, drawing upon online 
sources (e.g., Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Reuters, media reports, 
academic journals, and government documents, primarily in English). Sources were 
screened against inclusion and exclusion criteria established a priori. To meet inclusion 
criteria, sources had to: (1) Be relevant to conflict situations; (2) Be reputable and show 
evidence-based research, e.g., demonstrate a clear research design and methodology, 
use primary and secondary sources; and (3) Contain specific identifiable evidence that 
Side A or Side B used enslavement during the conflict. 
 
Media reports were included only when researchers were able to triangulate the 
information with sources that met the inclusion criteria. Due to the nature of conflict and 
the limited scope of peer-reviewed research in this field, we relied heavily on grey 
literature, specifically International Organizations and NGO reports. To avoid Type I and 
Type II errors, we triangulated data with additional sources, only coding enslavement if 
another source substantiated the claim. This presented challenges, as the reported data 
could differ in each record. For example, the reported prevalence of cases may have 
varied, or one source may have noted a specific date/year while another had not.  Our 
priority was to determine if and what type of enslavement was used in a conflict. In the 
case of Afghanistan, for example, 68 sources were used to corroborate the types of 
enslavement within the conflict, ranging from peer-reviewed journals to 
International/NGO reports to media articles. 
 
Table I: Key search terms used for  
identifying slavery in armed conflict 
Slavery human trafficking 
modern slavery child lab*r 
forced lab*r rape 
slavery like practice sale or exploitation of children 
domestic servitude use of child soldiers 
forced marriage female genital mutilation 
servile marriage logistic servitude 
early marriage conflict 
child marriage kidnapping 






We built upon the UCDP database and added several new variables: child soldiers, sexual 
slavery & forced marriage, forced labor, and human trafficking. Originally, we coded 
domestic servitude as a separate variable, but the textual evidence was mixed, and often 
domestic servitude was found to be a sub-set of forced labor or sexual enslavement & 
forced marriage. For that reason, we folded domestic servitude into the category of 
forced labor, or where another category predominated, into that category. We note 
slavery is complex and heterogeneous; victims may experience multiple forms of 
exploitation to different degrees at different times.  
 
Table II lists the types of enslavement, with their corresponding legal definitions, that we 
incorporated as new variables:  
 
 Table II: Types of enslavement, their definitions, and sources  
Type of Enslavement Definition Convention/Protocol 
Child Soldiers War crimes against child soldiers include conscripting or 
enlisting children under the ages of 15 years, or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities.  
Rome Statute, Article 8  
Sexual Exploitation / 
Forced Marriage 
'Any institution or practice whereby: A woman, without the 
right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment 
of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian 
family, or any other person or group; or The husband of a 
woman, his family or his clan, has the right to transfer her to 
another person for value received or otherwise; or A woman 
on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by 
another person.' 
United Nations 
Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, 
the Slave Trade and 
Institutions and 
Practices Similar to 
Slavery (1956) 
Forced Labor 'All work service which is exacted from any person under the 
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not 
offered himself voluntarily.' This excludes compulsory military 
service, normal civil obligations, penalties imposed by a court 
action taken in an emergency, and minor communal services.   
ILO Forced Labor 
Convention (1930) and 
Convention on 
Abolition of Forced 
Labor (1957) 
Human Trafficking  This includes three steps:  
1. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or 
receipt of persons; 
2. By means of threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the 
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the 
consent of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent 
of a person having control over another person; 
3. With the intent of exploiting that person through: 
prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, forced Labor, 
slavery (or similar practices), servitude, and removal of 
organs. The recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of 
exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ 
United Nations 
Trafficking in Persons 





even if this does not involve threat, use of force, or 
coercion. 
 
In coding the data, if we identified any of these types of enslavement (Child Soldiers, 
Sexual Exploitation/Forced Marriage, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking), we coded 
this as a '1': [this sub-type of enslavement] was used in the conflict. If there was no 
evidence of enslavement, then we coded that instance as a '0': it is unknown if [this sub-
type of enslavement] had been used in the conflict in question. If limited evidence existed, 
then we coded this as a '2': an educated guess that [this sub-type of enslavement] had 
occurred, based on evidentiary reports, but without a specified date. Making an educated 
guess reflects a limitation in this study and the difficulty in identifying enslavement based 
largely on an analysis of research reports. NGO reports, a significant part of our sources, 
often did not specify exact dates for enslavement in conflicts. The cases given an 
‘educated guess’ code were small in number: 3 cases for child soldiers (0.27% of total 
cases), 23 cases for sexual exploitation/forced marriage (2.07% of total cases), 26 cases 
for human trafficking (2.34% of total cases), and zero cases for forced labor. Our aim, 
therefore, was a conservative assessment of the materials analyzed. 
 
In addition to coding these types of enslavement, we recorded which side of the conflict 
within the UCDP Database (identified as 'Side A' or 'Side B') used enslavement. Documents 
that reported incidents of slavery, categorized by country for each conflict, were 
annotated by the researcher and then saved onto an online citation database, Mendeley.  
 
Questions of Terminology  
There are ongoing debates about the definition of contemporary slavery, as well as 
definitions of sub-types of enslavement. The use and understanding of key terms like 
'modern slavery' and 'human trafficking' vary with cultural, social, and political 
differences. For example, In the United States policy makers regularly use 'human 
trafficking' to refer to enslavement, while the United Kingdom's Modern Slavery Act (2015) 
specifies the overarching term is 'modern slavery.' 
 
Such differences often rest on local legal definitions that required consideration as we 
developed our coding. In identifying and coding child soldiering, for example, we 
considered the UN's (2015) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the ILO's Convention on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor. In the latter, the 'worst forms of child labor' specifically includes 
forced recruitment of children for use in armed conflict.  We also considered an expanded 
definition, the Cape Town Principles, used by child protection agencies, NGOs, and UNICEF. 
This definition states a child soldier is: 'Any person under 18 years of age who is part of 
any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but 
not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, and anyone accompanying such groups, other 
than family members. The Cape Town Principles definition includes girls recruited for 
sexual purposes and forced marriage' (Cape Town Principles, 1997). Clearly, there are 





logistical tasks) that an enslaved child might be forced to do. We sought to disaggregate 
these activities, while recognizing that they can be fluid and overlapping. When one 
activity predominated, it became the primary coded activity. 
 
Strategic Enslavement within Conflict 
The uses of enslavement in conflict are normally tactical, but throughout history, as well 
as today, slavery has also been used to serve strategic aims – e.g., on both sides of the 
American Civil War, as part of the strategy of genocide pursued by German/Axis forces in 
World War 2 (von Plato, Leh, and Thonfeld, 2010), and in the genocide by Pol Pot in 
Cambodia. More recently, ISIS made enslavement part of its strategy to exterminate the 
Yazidi people in Northern Iraq (Al-Dayel, Mumford, and Bales, 2020).  
 
Strategic enslavement in conflict is often linked to genocide and the practice of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’. It differs from tactical enslavement in ways that are both subtle and significant. 
Tactical enslavement is based upon a classification, often implicit rather than formally 
specified, of who is ‘eligible’ for enslavement and exploitation. In strategic enslavement, 
that classification often specifies who is ‘eligible’ for extermination. Enslavement and 
exploitation become part of a strategy of genocide. 
 
The one non-lethal form of strategic enslavement we have identified is 'ethnic cleansing' 
through rape. In this form, a woman deemed eligible for extermination is enslaved, but 
used initially, possibly primarily, to produce offspring for the enslaving group. In the case 
of ISIS, this meant impregnating women from an ethnic group marked for extermination. 
For ISIS, pregnancy erased a woman’s ethnicity, replacing it with the 'ethnic status' of the 
sperm and fetus forced upon her (Al-Dayel, Mumford, and Bales, 2020). In strategic 
enslavement, as in genocide, there is a clearly understood ‘target group’ that is eligible 
for both enslavement and extermination. 
 
Our coding also aimed to clarify how strategic enslavement was used. A code of 0 (not 
present) meant no evidence of strategic enslavement. A code of 1 was assigned if 'Target 
group members are enslaved and exploited in ways that support tactical aims, including 
within the strategic genocidal process, but with the assumption that they will be worked 
to death or disposed of when desired.' This code reflects the short-term utilitarian 
exploitation of labor from people marked for death, as was common in Nazi concentration 
camps. A code of 2 was assigned when female target group members were isolated, 
aborted if pregnant, then forcibly impregnated in order to: a) Remove them from 
the ’target’ group through possession and use; and b) Generate non-target group 
offspring; with the possible outcome of c) Being killed when no longer fertile/useful. A 
code of 3 was assigned if the conditions specified in both categories 1 and 2 obtained. We 







After creating new variables for these types of enslavement, we found that enslavement 
was pervasive in the 1,113 conflict-years recorded by the UCDP for 1989 to 2016, as Table 
III shows. 
 
Table III: Summary findings of contemporary slavery in armed conflict 
Child Soldiers  970 of all conflict-years (87.15%) 
Sexual Exploitation/Forced Marriage 382 of all conflict-years (32.25%) 
Forced Labor 262 of all conflict-years (20.93%) 
Human Trafficking 185 of all conflict-years (14.28%) 
 
Among the 1,113 conflict-years, 87% contained incidence of child soldiers, 32% 
sexploitation/forced marriage, 21% forced Labor, and 14% human trafficking.  
 
Child Soldiers 
The most current academic research and policy discussions on slavery in conflict tend to 
focus on child soldiers (e.g., Roos and Bohmelt, 2017; Harding and Kershner, 2018; 
Coundouriotis 2010). Table IV notes the frequent use of child soldiers by belligerents. 
 
Table IV: Frequency distribution of child soldiers in armed conflict 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
No evidence of child soldiers 140 12.58 12.58 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side A 27 2.43 15.00 
Enslavement of child soldiers by both sides  473 42.50 57.50 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side B 473 42.50 100.00 
Total 1,113 100.00  
 
Table IV, and those following, list the frequency of cases for the type of enslavement as 
well as the percent of cases and their cumulative percent. Only 140 of the 1,113 conflict 
years showed no use of child soldiers by either side. Side A (the nation-states Afghanistan, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, and Myanmar) was the lone/sole offender in 27 conflict-years.  
When Side B (a state or non-state actor) was the lone offender, child soldiering occurred 
in 473 conflict years, or 43% of conflicts. Non-state actors are too numerous to list here, 
but are found in the CSAC website. In 42.5% of conflict-years, both Sides A and B used 
child soldiers.  
 
This incidence of child soldier use suggests that enslavement is a significant part of 
modern warfare (see Roos, 2019 and highlights the need to address the underlying causes 
of this form of exploitation.  
 
Sexual Exploitation/Forced Marriage  
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage occurs in roughly one-third of the conflict-years we 






Table V: Frequency distribution of sexual exploitation/forced marriage in armed conflict 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
No evidence of sexual exploitation/forced marriage 731 65.68 65.68 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side A 110 9.88 75.56 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by both sides  137 12.31 87.87 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side B 135 12.13 100.00 
Total 1,113 100.00  
 
Compared to the use of child soldiers, sexual exploitation/forced marriage is evenly 
distributed across sides within a conflict. For Side A, this occurs in 110 cases, or 10% of 
conflict-years. For Side B, there are 135 instances, or 12% of conflict-years. When both 
sides are involved, there are 137 instances, also about 12% of conflict-years.  
 
Forced marriage resurfaced as a global issue after the discovery that more than 6,500 
Yazidi girls and women were captured and sold, or forced into ‘marriages’, by the Islamic 
State (Dearden, 2017). Nobel Laureate Nadia Murad (2018) notes that more than 3,000 
of these women and children are unaccounted for, and are likely still held by ISIS. Murad’s 
work speaks to broader questions that might be explored using these data: is it possible 
to liberate persons enslaved in forced marriage? How might the international community 
mitigate, or eradicate, this crime?  
 
Human Trafficking in Armed Conflict 
Table VI addresses human trafficking, the onward sale of enslaved persons, in armed 
conflict. Compared to other forms of enslavement, there are fewer instances of human 
trafficking. Side A trafficked persons in only 8 instances, less than one-percent of conflict-
years. This compares with Side B as the sole offender in 165 instances, or about 15% of 
all cases.  
 
Table VI: Frequency distribution of human trafficking in armed conflict 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
No evidence of human trafficking 928 83.38 83.83 
Human trafficking by Side A 8 0.72 84.10 
Human trafficking by both sides  12 1.08 85.18 
Human trafficking by Side B 165 14.82 100.00 
Total 1,113 100.00  
 
Forced Labor in Armed Conflict  
Forced labor is present in armed conflict, with Side A being the sole offender in 9% of 
conflict-years, and Side B being the sole offender in about 8% of conflict-years, as Table 
VII shows.   
 
Table VII: Frequency distribution of forced labor in armed conflict 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
No evidence of forced labor 851 76.46 76.46 





Forced labor by both sides  71 6.38 92.36 
Forced labor by Side B 85 7.64 100.00 
Total 1,113 100.00  
 
Strategic Enslavement in Armed Conflict 
 
Table VIII: Frequency distribution strategic enslavement in armed conflict 
      Freq. Percent Cum. 
No evidence of strategic enslavement 923 82.93 82.93 
Strategic enslavement by Side A         41 3.77 86.70 
Strategic enslavement by Both Sides  42 3.77 90.48 
Strategic enslavement by Side B 106 9.52 100.00 
Total      1,113 100.00  
 
Table VIII shows that although strategic enslavement is not common (occurring in about 
17% of all cases), Side B is more likely to employ strategic enslavement than Side A.  
 
Cross-Tabulations    
Enslavement occurs across armed conflict in a variety of ways. A person may be enslaved 
in different ways at different times (a child soldier might also be a victim of sexual 
exploitation or sold on in human trafficking). Given that our database is preliminary, we 
hesitate to perform inferential statistical analysis. That said, we look forward to 
discovering how these data might be used, through multivariate models, to illuminate the 
causes of enslavement in conflict. Given other measures of conflict within the UCDP 
Database, we offer cross tabulations examining different types of enslavement and their 
intersection with the following UCDP variables: Incompatibility, Intensity Level, and Type 
of Conflict.  
 
Conflict Incompatibility  
Incompatibility identifies what drove belligerents toward conflict: (1) a territorial dispute; 
(2) a governmental dispute; or (3) both. Table IX cross-tabulates our coded measures of 
enslavement with these types of incompatibility. Side A was rarely the lone offender, 
occurring in just 16 disputes. Side B, in comparison, was often the sole offender, enslaving 
children during 252 conflict-years over territory, and 221 conflict-years over 
governmental issues. When Side A and Side B both enslaved children, 190 conflict-years 
were over territory, and 282 were due to governmental disputes. 
 
Table IX also examines the intersection of sexual exploitation/forced marriage and 
conflict incompatibility. In territorial disputes, Side A was the sole offender in 88 conflict- 
years, more than double when Side B, or both sides, were involved. In governmental 
disputes, a mirror image appears. Side B was the sole offender in 110 conflict-years, four 
times more than Side A. When human trafficking occurred, Side B was usually the sole 
offender. When forced labor took place, Side A was more often the offender in territorial 







Table IX: Cross-tabulation of contemporary slavery in armed conflict 
 by conflict incompatibility, 1989 to 2016 









No evidence of child soldiers 96  44 0 140 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side A    16 11 0 27 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Both Sides  190 282 1 473 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side B 252 221 0 473 
Total 554 558 1 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) =  41.5441  Pr = 0.000  
     
Sexual Exploitation / Forced Marriage  
No evidence of sexual exploitation/forced marriage 417 313 1 731 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side A    88 22 0 110 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Both Sides  24 113 0 137 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side B 25 110 0 135 
Total 554 558 1 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 166.3910   Pr = 0.000 
 
Human Trafficking 
No evidence of human trafficking  507 420 1 928 
Human trafficking by Side A    2 6 0 8 
Human trafficking by Both Sides  1 11 0 12 
Human trafficking by Side B 44 121 0 165 
Total 554 558 1 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) =  54.6570   Pr = 0.000 
     
Forced Labor 
No evidence of forced labor 410 441 0 851 
Forced labor by Side A    99 7 0 106 
Forced labor by Both Sides  18 53 0 71 
Forced labor by Side B 27 57 1 85 
Total 554 558 1 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 121.0125   Pr = 0.000   
 
Conflict Intensity Level  
The UCDP database measures the intensity level of a conflict: (1) a minor dispute, if the 
conflict resulted in fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year; and (2) war, if 
there were at least 1,000 battle-related deaths.  
 
Table X sheds light on enslavement and conflict intensity. Child soldiers are enslaved more 
often in minor disputes than in wars, with Side A  rarely the sole offender. This differs 





When human trafficking is perpetrated, it will almost always be perpetrated solely by Side 
B. With forced Labor, Side A is likely to be the lone offender in minor disputes, compared 
with Side B which tends to use forced labor in both major or minor conflicts.  
 
Table X: Cross-tabulation of contemporary slavery in armed conflict  
by conflict intensity level, 1989 to 2016 





No evidence of child soldiers 132 8 140 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side A    18 9 27 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Both Sides  345 128 473 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side B 379 94 473 
Total 874 239 1,113 
Pearson chi2(3) =  32.3485   Pr = 0.000 
    
Sexual Exploitation / Forced Marriage 
No evidence of sexual exploitation/forced marriage 623 108 731 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side A    98 12 110 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Both Sides  83 54 137 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side B 70 65 135 
Total 874 239 1,113 
Pearson chi2(3) = 109.8577   Pr = 0.000 
 
Human Trafficking 
No evidence of human trafficking  772 156 928 
Human trafficking by Side A    2 6 8 
Human trafficking by Both Sides  3 9 12 
Human trafficking by Side B 97 68 165 
Total 874 239 1,113 
Pearson chi2(3) =  84.0731   Pr = 0.000 
 
Forced Labor 
No evidence of forced labor 697 154 851 
Forced labor by Side A    98 8 106 
Forced labor by Both Sides  39 32 71 
Forced labor by Side B 40 45 85 
Total 874 239 1,113 
Pearson chi2(3) =  91.3072   Pr = 0.000 
 
Type of Conflict   
Table XI examines contemporary slavery and UCDP’s four conflict types. First, a conflict is 
extrasystemic if it 'occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory.' 
Second, an interstate conflict 'occurs between two or more states.' Third, a conflict is 
internal if it 'occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal 





internationalized if it 'occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or 
both sides.'  
 
When child soldiering, sexual exploitation/forced marriage, human trafficking, or forced 
labor took place, it was most often during an internal armed conflict, and rarely ever 
during an interstate armed conflict. Indeed, Table XI shows there are only 9 instances of 
child soldiering and 2 instances of forced labor during an interstate armed conflict. 
Enslavement during internationalized internal armed conflicts was the second most 
common occurrence.  
 
Table XI: Cross-tabulation of contemporary slavery in armed conflict 













No evidence of child soldiers 20 104 16 140 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side A    7 20 0 27 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Both Sides  2 361 110 473 
Enslavement of child soldiers by Side B 0 425 48 473 
Total 29 910 174 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 189.7692   Pr = 0.000    
     
Sexual Exploitation / Forced Marriage 
No evidence of sexual exploitation/forced marriage 29 652 50 731 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side A    0 107 3 110 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Both Sides  0 103 34 137 
Sexual exploitation/forced marriage by Side B 0 48 87 135 
Total 29 910 174 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 320.3129   Pr = 0.000   
 
Human Trafficking 
No evidence of human trafficking  29 806 93 928 
Human trafficking by Side A    0 6 2 8 
Human trafficking by Both Sides  0 12 2 12 
Human trafficking by Side B 0 86 79 165 
Total 29 910 174 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 157.7459   Pr = 0.000 
 
Forced Labor 
No evidence of forced labor 27 702 122 851 
Forced labor by Side A    2 101 3 106 
Forced labor by Both Sides  0 53 18 71 
Forced labor by Side B 0 54 31 85 





Pearson chi2(6) =  51.5739   Pr = 0.000 
 
Strategic Enslavement 
Although strategic enslavement is rare in armed conflict, Table XII sheds light. In terms of 
conflict incompatibility, Side B is most often the lone offender in governmental disputes.  
In terms of conflict intensity, Side B is often the culprit in major disputes. With respect to 
conflict type, Side B is likely the lone offender in internationalized internal armed conflicts.  
 
Table XII: Cross-tabulation of strategic enslavement in armed conflict, 1989 to 2016 
 






No evidence of Strategic Enslavement 491 431 1 923 
Strategic Enslavement by Side A    38 4 0 42 
Strategic Enslavement by Both Sides  4 38 0 42 
Strategic Enslavement by Side B 21 85 0 106 
Total 554 558 1 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 97.8696   Pr = 0.000     
 
 
Conflict Intensity  Minor  
Dispute 
War Total 
No evidence of Strategic Enslavement  776 147 923 
Strategic Enslavement by Side A     36 6 42 
Strategic Enslavement by Both Sides   13 29 42 
Strategic Enslavement by Side B  49 57 106 
Total  874 239 1,113 
Pearson chi2(3) = 140.0866   Pr = 0.000   
 
 
    









No evidence of Strategic Enslavement 29 778 116 923 
Strategic Enslavement by Side A    0 41 1 42 
Strategic Enslavement by Both Sides  0 35 7 42 
Strategic Enslavement by Side B 0 56 50 106 
Total 29 910 174 1,113 
Pearson chi2(6) = 96.5571   Pr = 0.000    
     
Conclusion 
A lack of data has meant that enslavement within armed conflicts is little understood. A 
new dataset, Contemporary Slavery in Armed Conflict (CSAC), built upon the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, codes instances of slavery within conflicts occurring from 1989 to 





and state and non-state actors sometimes use enslavement to pursue strategic aims. This 
dataset is a step toward illuminating the dark intersection of slavery and armed conflict.  
 
We note that slavery in conflict is distinctly and powerfully gendered. These data point to 
the widespread violent capture, enslavement, and exploitation of women by men in 
conflict. Parallel to this gendered enslavement is the fact that conflict facilitates predation 
on the very young - often by those not that much older. Children are vulnerable to abuse 
and enslavement, easier to control in the fluid context of battle, and likely to be seen as 
disposable inputs into the war effort. Exploitation of children within conflict stands in 
stark contrast to the social norms of the same warring societies in peacetime. Our 
intention is to support research addressing the specific exploitation of women and 
children in conflict. 
 
Our aim is to extend these data further into the past and nearer the present. There are 
many unanswered questions: What are the reasons/predictors for tactical enslavement, 
and for strategic enslavement? Does enslavement in conflict continue into times of peace, 
and in what ways?  How can policymakers, NGO’s, and practitioners best understand the 
mechanisms of enslavement within conflict in order to prevent its occurrence? How might 
we best help survivors of enslavement in conflict? What are the physical and 
psychological effects of conflict enslavement on the victims and perpetrators? We are 
considering these and other questions as we move forward with this research agenda – 
and we invite consultation, collaboration, and cooperation. 
 
Replication data 
The dataset and codebook for the empirical analysis in this article are available 
at https://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/ as well as at https://www.csac.org.uk . All analyses 
were conducted using STATA 15.1.  
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